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ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE INTEGRATION IDEAL
RACHEL D. GODSIL*
INTRODUCTION
We are invited in this symposium to consider the paradox of
the title: Brown is Dead? Long Live Brown! Is it possible to adhere
to both declarations simultaneously? I cannot deny that there is
evidence of Brown’s demise or at the very least ill health; though
there is also recent evidence of its continuing vitality in both census
data suggesting a decline in segregation and the Supreme Court’s
recent decision upholding affirmative action.1 This essay has a different purpose, though. Here, I will argue that the disproportionate burden of pollution upon segregated communities of color
compels the conclusion that there is a dire need to resuscitate
Brown and press for implementation of its integrative promise.
In the 1980s, it became part of the national dialogue that
neighborhoods comprised of predominantly Blacks and Latinos
were more likely than white neighborhoods to be saturated with
pollution. This finding electrified people living in such neighborhoods, as well as activists and academics, and resulted in the concept of “environmental racism.”2
* Associate Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law; J.D. University of
Michigan Law School, 1992. Thanks to Michelle Adams, Tristin Green, Florence Wagman Roisman, Charles Sullivan, Michael Zimmer, and the participants in New York Law
School’s Brown is Dead? Long Live Brown!: A Commemorative Symposium for thoughtful
suggestions and criticisms. Amanda Kelly provided invaluable research assistance.
1. See infra notes 12-16; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
2. See Eileen Gauna, Federal Environmental Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and Incentives
on the Road to Environmental Justice, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1995). “The coining of the
phrase ‘environmental racism’ is attributed to Dr. Benjamin Chavis, former Executive
Director of the United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, which released
its landmark study documenting exposures to hazardous waste sites in 1987. [Dr.
Chavis defines racism as] racial prejudice plus power. . . . Racism is more than just a
personal attitude; it is the institutionalized form of that attitude.” Id. at 87 n.1 (citing
Benjamin F. Chavis, Preface in COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF
CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON RACIAL
AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES
ix-x (1987)).
1109
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After two decades the issue that continues to bedevil activists,
advocates, and scholars is how to respond to the disparate burden
of environmental hazards. To date, the main responsive visions
have been calls for more racially equitable distributions of environmental burdens and the empowerment of communities to better
resist their fate.3 Each of these visions presupposes racially segregated communities and posits that people of all races should share
the burdens of pollution and waste. The primary contrary argument has been from those who deny that “environmental racism”
exists as a problem.4 According to this view, the disparate burden
of environmental hazards upon people of color is simply a result of
our market economy. Some of these market adherents contend
that Blacks and Latinos bear a greater burden of environmental
3. Luke Cole and Sheila Foster describe the institutionalization of environmental
justice principles into federal policy as one lasting success of the environmental justice
movement. But Cole and Foster view the transformative potential of environmental
justice as more critical than specific government programs. See LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA
R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 161-64 (2001); See also Gauna, supra note 2; Eileen
Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the Paradigm Paradox, 17
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (1998); Deeohn Ferris, New Public Policy Tools in the Grassroots Movement: The Washington Office on Environmental Justice, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 711 (1995);
Deeohn Ferris, Communities of Color and Hazardous Waste Cleanup: Expanding Public Participation in the Federal Superfund Program, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 671 (1994). See, e.g., Robert D. Bullard, Introduction to UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND
COMMUNITIES OF COLOR xv, xvii (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994):
Activists have targeted disparate enforcement, compliance, and policy formulation as they affect environmental and public health decision making
on a wide range of issues, from toxic waste to urban transportation. . . .
These leaders are demanding a shared role in the decision-making
processes that affect their communities. They want participatory democracy to work for them.
Id. at xvii. For a thoughtful critique of the ambiguity of the specific normative visions
underlying the calls for equity, see Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001
(1993).
4. See, e.g., Lynn E. Blais, Environmental Racism Reconsidered, 75 N.C. L. REV. 75, 85
(1996) (citing Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383, 1384-87 (1994); Christopher
Boerner & Thomas Lambert, Environmental Injustice, 118 PUB. INT. 61, 65-68
(1995)[hereinafter Boerner & Lambert, Environmental Injustice]; Richard J. Lazarus,
Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87
NW. U. L. REV. 787, 796 (1993)); Thomas Lambert & Christopher Boerner, Environmental Inequity: Economic Causes, Economic Solutions, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 195, 200-12 (1997)
[hereinafter Lambert & Boerner, Environmental Inequity].
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hazards because they have less power in the market and are thus apt
to “come to the nuisance.”5 Others suggest that communities comprised of Blacks and Latinos are what I will call “pollution magnets”
because land is cheaper in these communities and because the
communities are less able to attract other economic development
and must accept polluting facilities.6 Thus, market adherents suggest redistributing environmental burdens from areas currently
comprised by people of color is both morally and ethically unnecessary since the current distribution does not necessarily reflect racism, but simply the distributional effects of our economy. In
addition, they claim that any redistribution would be futile.7 Any
area containing polluting facilities will repel those able to leave (upper income whites) and attract those with no other options (lower
income people of color). Therefore, redistribution will simply pollute more areas without resulting in a more racially equitable sharing of the burden. Instead, efforts should be directed at helping
Blacks and Latinos gain more power in the market through eliminating employment or housing discrimination.
In this essay, I rebut the empirical underpinnings of the market adherents, but I also set forth the view that those of us con5. Vicki Been has articulated the market theory, but also provided a nation-wide
study that at least in one context – hazardous waste siting – contradicts the theory. See
Been, supra note 4; Vicki Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the
Barrios? A Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1
(1997) (findings of studies do not support the market claim). For additional refutation
of the coming to the nuisance theory, see Manuel Pastor, Jr. et al., Which Came First?
Toxic Facilities, Minority Move-In, and Environmental Justice, 23 J. URB. AFF. 1, 1-21 (2001).
Notably, the study found that racial transition was an important predictor of the siting
of toxic facilities. Professor Pastor suggests that communities comprised of multiple
racial and ethnic groups possess less “social capital” – defined as formal and informal
community organizations – than areas comprised of a single race and thus single-race
communities may be better able to defeat an unwanted land use than an area with
multiple racial and ethnic groups. See Manuel Pastor, POLITICAL ECONOMY RESEARCH
INSTITUTE, Building Social Capital to Protect Natural Capital: The Quest for Environmental
Justice, in WORKING PAPER SERIES No. 11, at 10 (Univ. of Mass. Amherst, 2001).
6. Some commentators have argued that current sitings in predominantly poor
minority communities are not cause for concern because they are simply a result of
“community preferences.” See, e.g., Blais, supra note 4, at 85 (citing Been, supra note 4,
at 1384-87; Boerner & Lambert, Environmental Injustice, supra note 4, at 65-68; Lazarus,
supra note 4, at 796); Lambert & Boerner, Environmental Inequity, supra note 4, at 20012. But see Alice Kaswan, Distributive Justice and the Environment, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1031,
1037, 1081-86 (2003).
7. See infra notes 62-67.
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cerned with environmental justice should focus more attention on
housing integration as an ultimate goal. We must at least acknowledge that, in some instances, exit and integration may be the best
option for residents of particularly environmentally beleaguered,
racially segregated communities. This contention differs from
much of my previous work. I, like many who have been working as
environmental justice advocates, have been animated by a vision of
community empowerment for residents of poor communities of
color.8 This vision tends to translate into the espousal of remedies
aimed at preserving existing communities — “community preservationist” remedies. But I am concerned that I may have been reifying ‘the community’ at the expense of the individuals and
families who may have distinct needs and aspirations. These needs
and aspirations may in fact be better met by finding ways for people
to leave their current communities than by seeking to overcome
decades of pollution and neglect.9
I hope to begin a discussion of a broader normative dilemma:
should we be striving for a racially segregated society in which environmental burdens are broadly distributed among different racial
groups or a racially integrated society in which environmental burdens are highly concentrated? I admit a potentially unpopular
preference for the latter. In this essay I will begin to sketch out why
and suggest areas requiring further research. I acknowledge at the
outset that my argument is partially rooted in my view that racial
integration should be an ideal for our society apart from environmental concerns (though that argument is beyond the scope of this
8. See, e.g., Rachel D. Godsil & James S. Freeman, Jobs, Trees, and Autonomy: The
Convergence of the Environmental Justice Movement and Community Economic Development, 5
MD. J. OF CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 25 (1994) [hereinafter Godsil & Freeman, Jobs, Trees
and Autonomy]; James S. Freeman & Rachel D. Godsil, The Question of Risk: Incorporating
Community Perceptions into Environmental Risk Assessments, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 547
(1994) [hereinafter Freeman & Godsil, Question of Risk].
9. Consistent with this view, in my most recent article, I propose what I call a
“Resident’s Choice Rule” for nuisance disputes concerning proposed polluting facilities
in already environmentally beleaguered communities. See Rachel D. Godsil, Viewing the
Cathedral from Behind the Color Line: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Environmental Racism, 53 EMORY L. J. 1807 (2004). This Rule would allow residents to decide by majority
vote whether they preferred to enjoin a new facility or to receive damages in the form
of the value of their home multiplied by a “segregation” multiplier to equal the value of
a similar sized home in a neighborhood comprised primarily by racial minorities. Id.
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essay).10 I also admit that I am concerned that the vision of racially
segregated communities bearing equal shares of pollution is politically impossible. I am convinced that the dynamics of racism would
doom racially segregated communities of color to be the dominant
group’s dumping ground.11 In other words, intractable as the issue
of residential segregation has seemed, I think it may be essential as
a remedy to environmental racism.
PART I: TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY SEGREGATION
The 2000 census results marked a decline in the residential
segregation of Black Americans for the first time in twenty years.12
Despite this more promising trend, Blacks and Latinos continue to
experience extremely high levels of segregation — particularly in
urban areas.13 The statistics are stark: in more than twenty metropolitan areas, the vast majority of Blacks “live within large, contiguous settlements of densely inhabited neighborhoods that are
packed tightly around the urban core. In plain terms, they live in
10. Legal scholarship is beginning to witness a reinvigoration of racial integration
as a democratic ideal. See generally SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW
RACE AND CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM (2004). For example, I share
the view expressed by Michelle Adams that racial integration is crucial to “perfecting
American democracy through the recognition of the dignity and worth of every person.” Michelle Adams, Radical Integration (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), at 16. John powell has argued that integration will create a society “in which all
individuals and groups have equal opportunities to fashion and participate in the democratic process.” Id. at 68 (quoting john powell, An “Integrated” Theory of Integrated Education (The Civil Rights Project, Aug. 30, 2002)).
11. Vicki Been has exhaustively articulated the myriad ways in which wealthy white
communities can thwart efforts to distribute environmental burdens in their neighborhoods. Been, supra note 3.
12. See EDWARD L. GLAESER & JACOB L. VIGDOR, THE BROOKINGS INST., RACIAL SEGREGATION IN THE 2000 CENSUS: PROMISING NEWS 3 (2001); Florence Wagman Roisman,
Keeping the Promise: Ending Racial Discrimination and Segregation in Federally Financed Housing, HOW. L.J., n.18 (forthcoming 2005) (citing LEWIS MUMFORD CTR., ETHNIC DIVERSITY
GROWS, NEIGHBORHOOD INTEGRATION LAGS BEHIND (2001), available at http://
mumford1.dyndns.org/cen2000/WholePop/WPreport/MumfordReport.pdf); JOHN R.
LOGAN, LEWIS MUMFORD CTR., SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: THE NEIGHBORHOOD GAP FOR
BLACKS AND HISPANICS IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA (2002), available at http://
browns4.dyndns.org/cen2000_s4/SepUneq/SUReport/SURepPage1.htm; JOHN R. LOGAN ET AL., LEWIS MUMFORD CTR., SEPARATING THE CHILDREN (2001), available at http://
browns4.dyndns.org/cen2000_s4/Under18Pop/U18Preport/MumfordReport.pdf.
(discussing segregation of Black and white children).
13. GLAESER & VIGDOR, supra note 12, at 3.
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ghettos.”14 African Americans and Puerto Ricans are likely to live
in segregated neighborhoods whether they live in urban areas or
suburbs.15 In northeast urban cities, Blacks and whites generally
reside in deeply racially divided neighborhoods.16
In the United States in the beginning of the twenty-first century, “one’s neighborhood largely determines one’s achievements.
Living in the wrong neighborhood often means a poor education,
greater exposure to crime, fewer positive role models, and inadequate municipal services.”17 As I have quoted elsewhere:
In a racially segregated city, any increase in Black poverty
is necessarily confined to a small number of geographically isolated and racially homogenous neighborhoods.
During times of recession, therefore, viable and economically stable black neighborhoods are transformed into areas of intense socioeconomic deprivation, where
joblessness, welfare dependency and single parenthood
14.

DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 77 (1993). Massey and Denton made this statement concerning 1980 census data, but the trend continued in the decades to follow.
See Nancy A. Denton, Are African Americans Still Hypersegregated?, in RESIDENTIAL
APARTHEID: THE AMERICAN LEGACY 49, 63 (Robert D. Bullard et al. eds., 1994) (addressing 1990 data).
15. Massey and Denton measure segregation according to five separate dimensions: unevenness, isolation, clustering (into a large contiguous enclave), concentration, and centralization. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 14, at 74. Hypersegregation is
the term Massey and Denton use to describe a pattern of segregation on at least four of
the five dimensions. Id. They found Blacks to be hypersegregated in sixteen metropolitan cities in 1980. Id. Denton found twenty hypersegregated metropolitan areas using
1990 census data. See Denton, supra note 14, at 63; Douglas S. Massey, The Residential
Segregation of Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians: 1970 to 1990, in IMMIGRATION AND RACE: NEW
CHALLENGES FOR AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 44 (Gerald D. Jaynes ed., 1995) (finding that
40% of the total Black population in the United States lived in hypersegregated cities in
1990).
16. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., How Race and Poverty Intersect to Prevent Integration: Destabilizing Race as a Vehicle to Integrate Neighborhoods, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1595, 1608 (1995). In
the South, degrees of segregation tend to be slightly less: while Blacks tend to live in
defined neighborhoods, these neighborhoods are more likely to overlap with white
neighborhoods. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 14, at 77-78. There are exceptions to
this tendency, however. Atlanta, Baltimore, and Dallas/Ft. Worth were all hypersegregated according to 1980 census data. Id. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RACIAL AND ETHNIC RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 1980-2000 59 (Aug. 2002).
17. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Integration Game, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 1965, 1966 (2000).
AND THE
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become the norm and where crime and social disorder
are inextricably woven into the fabric of daily life.18

What became apparent only in the 1980s, however, is that segregation also leads to an increased burden of pollution.
A. The Rise of the Environmental Justice Movement
Few now dispute that “[e]nvironmental hazards are inequitably
distributed in the United States, with poor people and people of
color bearing a greater share of pollution than richer people and
white people.”19 This conclusion has been confirmed by scores of
studies.20 But the link of race and pollution only became a political
issue in the mid-1980s, when activists and academics brought it to
the fore. Although no one has studied whether the issue of environmental justice resulted from changing attitudes toward integration, it is perhaps not surprising that civil rights leaders began to
pay attention to issues of pollution facing predominantly Black
communities in the early 1980s. Noted scholars such as Alex Johnson have argued that the promise of integration that had been so
bright in the 1960s and 1970s diminished in the 1980s.21 Johnson
contends that by 1980 it had become apparent that “the dream of
integration had given way to the reality of increased segregation in
18. Godsil, supra note 9, at 1834. Douglas S. Massey, Getting Away with Murder:
Segregation and Violent Crime in Urban America, U. PA. L. REV. 1203, 1210 (1995).
19. COLE & FOSTER, supra note 3, at 10. Even the most vociferous critics of the
environmental justice movement acknowledge this fact. See, e.g., Dr. Michael S. Greve,
Environmental Justice or Political Opportunism?, 9 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 475, 476
(1994) (“[I]t is undeniably true that minorities and the poor live in less desirable environments than the wealthy.”).
20. COLE FOSTER, supra note 3, at 167-83 (an annotated bibliography of studies
and articles that document and describe the disproportionate impact of environmental
hazards by race and income); JAMES P. LESTER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES: MYTHS AND REALITIES 9-21 (2001). Sheila Foster and other environmental justice scholars caution against an exclusive focus upon the distribution of polluting
facilities and argue that such a focus may obscure larger questions of political, economic, and social equality. See Sheila Foster, Justice From the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice
Movement, 86 CAL. L. REV. 775, 788-807 (1998). See also IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND
THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 16, 22-23 (1990). I agree entirely with Foster. But Alice
Kaswan argues persuasively that distributional inequities alone should be sufficient to
bring attention to a community’s plight without other indicia of injustice. Kaswan,
supra note 6, at 1054-56.
21. Johnson, supra note 16, at 1607.
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our major urban cities and the problems associated with such
ghettos.”22
In the 1980s, national civil rights activists joined community
members opposing the siting of a PCB-contaminated soil dump in
the predominantly Black community of Afton, in Warren County,
North Carolina.23 The presence of well-known leaders drew national attention to what might otherwise have been a local dispute,
and Walter Fauntroy of the Congressional Black Caucus was
prompted to commission the United States General Accounting Office (“GAO”) to study the distribution of hazardous waste landfills
22.
23.

Id.
ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY 35 (1990) [hereinafter BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE]:
Blacks did not launch a frontal assault on environmental problems affecting their communities until these issues were couched in a civil rights context beginning in the early 1980s. . . . Demonstrations and protests were
triggered after Warren County, North Carolina, which is mostly black, was
selected as the burial site for more than 32,000 cubic yards of soil contaminated with highly toxic PCBs (polychlorinated biphenyls). The soil had
been illegally dumped along the roadways in fourteen North Carolina
counties in 1978.
Id. See also Robert D. Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental Racism and the Environmental
Justice Movement, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS 15, 24-26 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993) [hereinafter CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM]; COLE & FOSTER, supra note 3, at 19-34; LESTER ET AL., supra note 20, at 2733; Been, supra note 3; Blais, supra note 4, at 75; Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to
Environmental Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619,
635-42 (1992) [hereinafter Cole, Empowerment]; Rachel D. Godsil, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 394 (1991). For a discussion of the Warren County movement, see BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra, at 35-38 and DAVID E. NEWTON,
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 1-3 (1996). But the interplay between race and pollution was recognized decades before the emergence of a defined
national movement. LESTER ET AL., supra note 20, at 25. For example, residents of a
largely Black community in Houston held demonstrations to protest the siting of a cityowned garbage dump as early as 1967. COLE & FOSTER, supra note 3, at 19; LESTER ET
AL., supra note 20, at 25. The largely Latino United Farm Workers began their organizing against pesticide poisoning in the 1960s. COLE & FOSTER, supra note 3, at 19-20.
Indeed, in the early 1970s, as the mainstream environmental movement was growing,
the recently created Council on Environmental Quality devoted a chapter of its second
annual report to the environmental quality of inner cities. LESTER ET AL., supra note 20,
at 25; See also Robert D. Bullard, Race and Environmental Justice in the United States, 18
YALE J. INT’L L. 319, 327-28 (1993) [hereinafter Bullard, Race and Environmental Justice];
Cole, Empowerment, supra, at 637 n.58; Michele Tingling-Clemmons, Twenty Years of Action by People of Color, in WE SPEAK FOR OURSELVES: SOCIAL JUSTICE, RACE AND ENVIRONMENT 22, 22-23 (Dana Alston ed., 1990). Contra Marc R. Poirier, Environmental Justice
and the Beach Access Movements of the 1970s in Connecticut and New Jersey: Stories of Property
and Civil Rights, 28 CONN. L. REV. 719, 821 n.10 (1996). Professor Poirier notes that
despite some brief discussions, there has not yet been a systematic exploration of the
role of distributional and equity concerns in the early environmental movement.
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in the South.24 This study found that three of four hazardous waste
facilities in the South were located in predominantly Black communities.25 Following the publicity surrounding the GAO study, academics began to undertake further studies of the distribution of
environmental risks, and grassroots activists began to organize
around both local disputes and wider environmental issues.26 The
culmination of early grassroots organizing was the First People of
Color Environmental Leadership Summit (“the Summit”), held in
Washington D.C., in October 1991.27 The Summit resulted in
“[u]nprecedented alliances . . . [and] conceptual linkages between
seemingly different struggles, identifying common themes of racism
and economic exploitation of people and land.”28
Following the Summit, activists and researchers continued to
focus on establishing the empirical support for the claims that people of color and the poor are disproportionately burdened by varying forms of pollution.29 The finding most surprising to many is
that in studies analyzing only race and class correlations with environmental risk, “race is the most important predictor of risk.”30 In
other words, the issue was not simply the prevalence of poverty
among minority group members. In the more multi-factor studies
that included consideration of additional explanations for expo24. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 23, at 35-58.
25. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS
AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF CORRESPONDING COMMUNITIES 4 (1983).
26. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 23, at 15-16; COLE & FOSTER, supra
note 3, at 25; LESTER ET AL., supra note 20, at 28-29. Cole and Foster point out that
academic studies finding a correlation between the placement of polluting facilities and
race “dialectically” fueled and were fueled by the movement. COLE & FOSTER, supra
note 3, at 25. Grassroots activists were aided by the studies when engaged in specific
struggles, and, perhaps as importantly, realized that their individual struggles “were
part of a national pattern.” Id. (quoting activist Mary Lou Mares). Conversely, the
academics were guided and taught by the community residents. Id.
27. See, e.g., COLE & FOSTER, supra note 3, at 31; Manuel Pastor, Political Economy
Research Institute, Environmental Justice: Reflections from the United States, in CONFERENCE
PAPER SERIES NO. 1 (Univ. of Mass. Amherst, Nov. 2002).
28. COLE & FOSTER, supra note 3, at 32.
29. See, e.g., id. at 167-83 (listing studies that document the disproportionate burden of pollution upon people of color and the poor, ranging from toxic waste dumps,
air pollution, lead, and pesticides). LESTER ET AL., supra note 20, at 12-14 (listing the
quantitative equity studies which test whether people of color are disproportionately
exposed to environmental harm).
30. LESTER ET AL., supra note 20, at 14.

R

R
R

R

R

R

R

\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-4\NLR408.txt

1118

unknown

Seq: 10

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

29-APR-05

9:31

[Vol. 49

sure to risk such as proximity to industry and manufacturing, political mobilization, the communities’ overall environmental
condition, and population and transit grids, race and class continue
to constitute statistically significant predictors of risk — though not
all studies found race to be the most important predictor.31
The most recent nationwide study of environmental risk consisted of a multi-level study of the role of race, class, and political
mobilization and exposure to environmental risk as measured by
the Toxic Release Index.32 Based upon state, county, and city level
analyses, researchers found that the percentage of Black and Latino
residents to be a significant predictor of the presence of toxic releases.33 They state that “as the percent black population increases,
so does the level of two out of seven state-level environmental
harms and four out of four city-level environmental harms.”34 In
addition, they found that outside of the South, increasing levels of
the Black population are exposed to “higher levels of nitrogen oxide, carbon dioxide, and sulphur dioxide air pollutants and hazardous waste.”35
Several nationwide studies have documented the relationship
between race and the presence of toxic wastes. In 1987, a nationwide study, Toxic Waste and Race in the United States, conducted by
Charles Lee of the United Church of Christ’s Commission for Racial Justice (“CRJ”), was published documenting the disproportionate36 distribution of toxic waste37 facilities in the United States.38
31. Id. at 149-57.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 152-55.
34. Id. at 152.
35. Id.
36. Environmental burdens would be distributed “proportionately” if each racial
or ethnic group were affected consonant with their proportion in the population at
large; thus, the use of the term “disproportionate” means that a greater percentage of a
particular racial or ethnic group is affected than one would expect given their proportion in the population at large. That a distribution is disproportionate does not in and
of itself mean that the distribution is unfair or unjust. See Blais, supra note 4, at 80-81.
But I adopt Alice Kaswan’s cogent argument that under widely accepted theories of
justice, the disproportionate distribution of environmental hazards is unjust. See generally Kaswan, supra note 6.
37. Toxic or hazardous waste is defined by the Environmental Protection Agency
as “by-products of industrial production which present particularly troublesome health
and environmental problems.” COLE & FOSTER, supra note 3, at 203 n.1 (quoting
UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN
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The CRJ study measured the relationship between commercial hazardous waste sites and uncontrolled hazardous waste sites and the
racial, socioeconomic, and ethnic makeup of communities in which
they are located.39 The study found that “race was consistently a
more prominent factor in the location of commercial hazardous
waste facilities than any other factor examined.”40 In addition, the
study found that three out of every five Blacks and Latinos live in
communities with uncontrolled toxic waste sites41 and that Blacks
were over-represented in the population of cities with the highest
numbers of uncontrolled toxic waste sites. This study was updated
in 1994 using 1990 census data and researchers found even greater
racial disparities in the concentration of people of color living in
zip codes housing toxic waste sites.42 While some have been critical
of the CRJ methodology,43 Professor Vicki Been conducted a nationwide study of the location of toxic waste facilities, using census
tracts rather than zip codes, that confirmed that toxic waste facilities are disproportionately located near Black and Latino
populations.44
UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACCOMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES xii (1987) [hereinafter TOXIC
WASTES AND RACE]).
38. See, e.g., COLE & FOSTER, supra note 3, at 55.
39. TOXIC WASTES AND RACE, supra note 37, at 9.
40. Id. at 15.
41. Uncontrolled toxic wastes are “closed and abandoned sites on the EPA’s list of
sites which pose a present and potential threat to human health and the environment.”
TOXIC WASTES AND RACE, supra note 37, at xii.
42. BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN & LAURA J. FITTON, CTR. FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES,
NAACP & UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, TOXIC WASTE
AND RACE REVISITED: AN UPDATE OF THE 1987 REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES 1 (1994) (study
found that from 1980 to 1993, the concentration of people of color in zip codes with
toxic wastes increased from 25% to 31%).
43. See, e.g., Douglas L. Anderton et al., Environmental Equity: Hazardous Waste Facilities: “Environmental Equity” Issues in Metropolitan Areas, 18 EVALUATION REV. 123 (1994);
Douglas L. Anderton et al., Environmental Equity: The Demographics of Dumping, 31 DEMOGRAPHY 229 (1994).
44. Been & Gupta, supra note 5. This study followed Been’s hypothesis that the
cause of disproportionate land uses was not discriminatory siting patterns, but rather,
the out-migration of whites and higher income people of color and the in-migration of
poor whites and people of color who have fewer housing options. See Been, supra note
4.
THE
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The findings of disparate burden of toxic waste were clearly
the catalyst for the movement, but the chronic air quality problems
in urban areas in the Northeast and California actually pose a
greater threat to the immediate health and welfare of people of
color.45 Outdoor air pollution causes short-term adverse health effects and contributes to and aggravates chronic conditions such as
asthma, lung cancer, and respiratory and cardiovascular diseases.46
This is of particular concern to children and the elderly who are
especially vulnerable to the effects of air pollution, including ozone
and particulate matter: the Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) states that short-term exposure to ozone can cause lung
inflammation and that repeated exposure may “damage children’s
developing lungs and may lead to reduced lung function later in
life.”47 Exposure to airborne particulate has been associated with
aggravated asthma, bronchitis, heartbeat irregularities, and heart
attacks.48
Equally troubling, Black and Latino children are disproportionately affected by lead poisoning.49 While national blood lead
levels are dropping, children of color have disproportionately high
levels.50 Recent studies suggest that even low levels of lead poisoning affect brain development, “lowering I.Q. scores and causing language and attention problems, as well as disturbing behavior.”51
Children with elevated lead levels are also more likely to engage in
antisocial and criminal behavior.52
45. EPA, EPA’s Draft Report on the Environment 2003, at Chapter 1 — Cleaner Air,
1.1, 1-23.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Lazarus, supra note 4, at 815.
50. See Debra J. Brody et al., Blood Lead Levels in U.S. Population, 272 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N. 277, 279 (1994); CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Preventing Lead
Poisoning in Young Children (1991) (lead poisoning much higher in African American
communities than in white communities; rates vary with income levels).
51. See Jane E. Brody, Even Low Lead Levels Pose Perils for Children, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
5, 2003, at F7. See also Paul Mushak, The Landmark Needleman Study of Childhood Lead
Poisoning: Scientific and Social Aftermath, 2 PSR Q. 165 (1992); Herbert L. Needleman,
Childhood Lead Poisoning: Man-Made and Eradicable, 2 PSR Q. 130 (1992) [hereinafter
Needleman, Childhood Lead Poisoning]; Herbert L. Needleman et al., Deficits in Psychologic and Classroom Performance of Children with Elevated Denture Lead Levels, 300 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 689 (1979) [hereinafter Needleman et al., Deficits].
52. Brody, supra note 51.
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As I have argued elsewhere,53 most studies to date are likely to
have underestimated the disparate burden of environmental hazards.
There have been few qualitative studies of the environment; rather,
the studies tend to focus on easily measurable facilities such as commercial hazardous waste facilities and data reported to the EPA pursuant to the Toxic Release Inventory.54 The few studies that are
more qualitative support my view: Professors Morello-Frosch, Pastor, and Sadd have employed recent advances in air emissions inventories in their studies of air quality in Los Angeles to consider a
broader range of outdoor air toxins and the effect of these emissions on human health.55 They found that minorities “face more
ambient air pollution and hence higher cancer risks at every income level.”56
The studies by Morello-Frosch, Pastor, and Sadd included
emissions from large stationary sources, small-scale industry such as
dry cleaners, auto body shops, and, most importantly, mobile
sources.57 The vast majority of other studies do not. By failing to
include those facilities that most affect people’s daily experience of
their environment, the studies are sorely lacking. In addition, most
studies fail to measure the cumulative effect of polluting facilities
and lack of municipal services faced by many poor, urban areas.
B. It’s the Market, Stupid
While some will instinctively find the conditions facing communities of color deeply troubling, a more typical response to this
evidence is to assume that the disparate distribution simply reflects
“market dynamics” and thus there should be no government intervention. This response perhaps serves as evidence to support Pro53. Godsil, supra note 9, at 1837.
54. See, e.g., FOSTER & COLE, supra note 3, at 167-83. There have been local studies
that are more exhaustive – and as Vicki Been noted in 1993, the local studies tend to
confirm the national findings. See Been, supra note 3, at 1012.
55. See, e.g., Morello-Frosch et al., Environmental Justice and Southern California’s
‘Riskscape’: The Distribution of Air Toxics Exposures and Health Risks Among Diverse Communities, 36 URB. AFF. REV. 551, 551-78 (2001); Pastor et al., Who’s Minding the Kids? Pollution,
Public Schools, and Environmental Justice in Los Angeles, 83 SOC. SCI. Q. 263, 263-80 (2002).
56. Pastor, supra note 27, at 8 (describing studies listed above).
57. See Been & Gupta, supra note 5, at 9-10 (explaining the decision to study only
commercial hazardous waste facilities).
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fessor Bell’s contention that Brown is indeed dead.58 Rather than
simply agreeing with Professor Bell, however, in this section, I will
outline and seek to contest this response. There are two versions of
the market dynamics critique: the “coming to the nuisance” claim59
and what I will term the “pollution magnet” claim.60 A third variant
is the “community preferences” critique.61 I will contend below
that all three market critiques fail to support a do-nothing response
to existing inequities.
The coming to the nuisance claim posits that polluting facilities were not disproportionately sited in minority communities at
the outset; instead, “the ‘dynamics of the housing and job markets’
led people of color and the poor to . . . move to areas that surround
waste facilities because those neighborhoods offered the cheapest
available housing.”62 Specifically, the supposition is that polluting
facilities cause people to become dissatisfied with the community
and to leave. But whites find it easier to move away from the facility
due to discrimination in the economic and housing markets, and
thus, minorities who live near the facility stay and other minorities
move into the less desirable housing left behind.
There are two replies to this argument. The short reply was
provided by the nationwide study of the siting of commercial hazardous waste treatment storage and disposal facilities conducted by
Vicki Been and Francis Gupta.63 While Been was an early proponent of the market dynamics theory, she and Gupta concluded after
completing the study that “[t]he analysis provides little support for
the theory that market dynamics following the introduction of a . . .
[hazardous waste facility] into a neighborhood might lead it to become poorer and increasingly populated by racial and ethnic mi58. Derrick A. Bell, The Unintended Lessons in Brown v. Board of Education, 49
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1053 (2005).
59. While this position is most often associated with Vicki Been, see Been, supra
note 4, at 1384; Been, supra note 3, at 1015, as is noted below, Been herself provided
the study that disproved the thesis. Some commentators continue to adhere to the
theory, however. See Lambert & Boerner, Environmental Inequity, supra note 4, at 202,
212.
60. I credit the term “pollution magnet” to my colleague Erik Lillquist who provided an insider’s view of my attempt to critique market adherents.
61. See generally Blais, supra note 4.
62. COLE & FOSTER, supra note 3, at 60 (quoting Been, supra note 3, at 1016).
63. Been & Gupta, supra note 5, at 34.
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norities.”64 In other words, they did not find evidence that whites
fled areas hosting hazardous waste sites, leaving them to be repopulated by Blacks and Latinos. Rather, Been and Gupta found
that the current disproportionate correlation of hazardous waste facilities with Black communities likely reflected the siting of such
facilities prior to 1970.65 In addition, Been and Gupta found positive evidence to support the conclusion that Latinos are likely to
populate communities sited for hazardous waste facilities.66 In a
study of toxic storage and disposal facility sitings within Los Angeles
County, Manuel Pastor, Jim Sadd, and John Hipp found that “disproportionate siting matters more than disproportionate minority
move-in; these authors also found, however, that “racial transition is
also an important predictor of siting.”67
While these studies of hazardous waste sitings undercut the
“coming to the nuisance” claim in the context of hazardous waste
sites, there have been studies suggesting an increase in the number
of poor people and minorities following the siting of polluting facilities.68 In addition, there is significant anecdotal evidence to support this story. For example, in my most recent work, I explored
the transformation of Camden, New Jersey from a fairly affluent,
mainly white city to a highly polluted city comprised mainly of poor
Blacks and Latinos.69 The experience of Camden and cities like it
suggest that poor Blacks and Latinos are sometimes forced to
“come to the nuisance.” As common sense would dictate, when an
area becomes saturated with polluting facilities, people who are
able will often move away. Those without options will be forced to
stay and others without options may also be forced to move in.70
The Camden story also supports the “pollution magnet” claim
that once an area is saturated with pollution and houses only poor,
64. Id. at 34.
65. Id. at 33.
66. Id.
67. Pastor et al., supra note 5, at 1.
68. See, e.g., Lambert & Boerner, Environmental Inequity, supra note 4, at 205 (studying demographic shifts following the siting of hazardous or polluting facilities in St.
Louis and finding an increase in minorities). But see Kaswan, supra note 6, at 1138-39
(discussing studies and concluding the evidence supporting the coming to the nuisance
theory is unclear).
69. Godsil, supra note 9, at 1822-32.
70. See Been, supra note 4, at 1389-90.
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powerless Blacks and Latinos, it becomes a “magnet” for further
polluting facilities because the land is cheap and the people living
there lack the political power successfully to oppose the facility.
Some market adherents would argue that both the coming to
the nuisance and the pollution magnet claims illustrate that the
market is working. Polluting facilities are being sited where the
land has the least value and where the people are least likely to
protest. In response to the claims of unfairness keeping some people in these polluted areas, they will likely retort that people obviously consider themselves to be better off with the housing in places
like Camden than being homeless or having to pay a greater portion of their income for housing elsewhere. But even market adherents should be willing to acknowledge that a market is only
working if it is free from defects. If the market suffers from defects,
then the notion that we as a society should not be concerned about
the disproportionate burden of polluting facilities should become
less palatable.71
As I have detailed in my previous work,72 segregated communities are not simply the result of the invisible hand of the market.
Rather, they were created by a combination of government and private racist practices. The federal government helped to create racially segregated Black and Latino inner cities and racially
segregated white suburbs by subsidizing whites, but not Blacks and
Latinos, to leave inner cities. White racism in the form of violence,
racially restrictive covenants, and block busting contributed to
keeping out even those Black and Latino families who had means.
Federal loan practices also devalued the property in the cities by
preventing investment in the cities through the mid-1960s. State
and local governments used zoning to prevent polluting facilities
and poor people from locating in suburbs. These practices kept
71. See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 3, at 61. (“The implications of this alternative
causal account is that where market dynamics produce current distributions, this fact
renders the outcomes somehow more benign. This implication stands on its own
terms, however, only if the market is unaffected by racial discrimination and other unjust processes.”). See also Kaswan, supra note 6, at 1143. (“Where both the market in
land uses and the housing market make it difficult for poor and minorities to act upon
private preferences against proximity to undesirable land uses, it is difficult to have
faith in the housing market as an adequate mechanism for meeting resident
preferences.”).
72. See Godsil, supra note 9, at 1838-50.
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poor people in inner cities, and allowed polluting facilities to locate
near the racially segregated residential areas in inner cities. Federal environmental laws and their state analogues too have failed to
focus adequate resources on protecting these same areas from the
ill-effects of pollution and have regulated pollution in a way that has
contributed to the concentration of pollution in certain areas. This
is not the story of a well-functioning free market. Rather, poor
Blacks and Latinos sometimes were forced to “come to the nuisance” because they were restricted from moving elsewhere. The
neighborhoods in which they live became “pollution magnets” for
the obvious reasons that they were zoned for industry and environmental laws did not restrict them, and also because the land had
been so otherwise devalued.
The effect of this nexus of governmental practices is that industry has been allowed to externalize the costs of pollution onto the
Black and Latino residents of inner cities. If zoning protected residential communities in inner cities as it does in suburbs, those wishing to purchase land for new facilities would have less land
immediately available. This would make land in purely industrial
areas more expensive. Industry would then either be required to
pay higher costs of land, or negotiate to rezone areas not zoned for
industry. If they sought to rezone areas that included residences,
those residents would have much greater negotiating power to either prevent the siting or to be bought out. Residents in areas
zoned for industry have little negotiating power to obtain either
outcome.
Existing facilities are able to externalize costs even more effectively as a result of grandfathering provisions in the environmental
laws. They spend significantly less on pollution prevention equipment because they are not subject to the pollution control laws.
Until recently, if a facility wished to upgrade and increase emissions
significantly, they were then subject to existing emissions laws, but
even this requirement may be eliminated.73
These market defects have resulted in severe costs to residents
in areas zoned for industry. These costs include pollution-related
illnesses such as asthma, a greatly decreased quality of life due to
73. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Draft of Air Rule is Said to Exempt Many Old Plants, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 22, 2003, at A1.
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the smells, noise, and sights of industry, and the net loss of property
value. Moreover, an expressive harm is also created when a racially
identifiable class of residents is forced to bear the costs of pollution
when the rest of society reaps the benefits.74 The individual residents often feel doubly victimized as they experience their illnesses as a direct result of societal racism.75
Some market adherents suggest that the proper response to
the harms described above is not to redistribute environmental burdens from existing racially segregated communities, but to enforce
fair housing and employment laws to ensure that mobility and job
opportunities are not impeded by racism in the future.76 While it is
certainly necessary and laudable to increase enforcement of fair
housing and employment laws, doing so will not address the market
defects that have been identified, for the historical wrongs have created a phenomena akin to the “market lock-in model of discrimination” initially identified by Daria Roithmayr in the law school
admissions context.77
In this work, Roithmayr borrows from economics and anti-trust
theory to understand how natural market forces can create barriers
to entry that make monopolies quite durable.78 This happens when
an “initial advantage or increase feeds back on itself to create an
even larger advantage or increase.”79 In the law school admissions
context, Roithmayr contends that whites’ anticompetitive behavior
during the segregation era has created a “locked-in, culturally specific network standard that favors whites.”80 Thus, she claims that
law school admissions are not, as posited, race neutral and efficient
74. See generally Rachel D. Godsil, Expressivism, Empathy and Equality, 36 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 247, 247-48 (2003).
75. See BULLARD, CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 23, at 8. “It is
no mystery that environmental justice groups discussed in this volume are attacking the
institutions they see providing advantages and privileges to whites while perpetuating
segregation, underdevelopment, disenfranchisement, and the poisoning (some would
use the term genocide) of their constituents.” Id.
76. See Blais, supra note 4, at 118-20; Been, supra note 3, at 1018-24; Lambert &
Boerner, Environmental Inequity, supra note 4, at 197; Greve, supra note 19, at 477.
77. Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-in Model of Discrimination, 86
VA. L. REV. 727 (2000).
78. Id. at 732.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 734.
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products of the market, but rather are the products of earlier racist
(anti-competitive) behavior of whites.81
The housing market is another example in which Blacks and
Latinos face barriers to entry resulting from earlier racist or anticompetitive behavior.82 Even though white residential areas in cities or suburbs have now lowered their express barriers to entry, the
earlier actions created a significant “feed-back” loop in which the
initial advantage continues to turn into an even larger advantage.
Earlier anti-competitive behavior, including federal government
disinvestment in the early decades of the twentieth century, expulsive zoning, and inadequate environmental protection, dramatically
devalued property in inner cities.83 Concurrently, the investment
in suburbs, exclusionary zoning, and greater environmental protection increased property values in white suburbs while also ensuring
that Blacks and Latinos lacked access to these resources. The present disconnect between property values in the inner cities and
those in the suburbs makes it very difficult for many people to leave
the inner cities and purchase homes in the suburbs. Thus, even if
housing discrimination is no longer a problem (in other words,
whites are no longer engaging in anti-competitive behavior), there
remain significant barriers to entry.
Market adherents may respond that ending employment discrimination should allow Blacks and Latinos to find employment,
which in turn will allow them greater resources and mobility options. Even if employment discrimination and housing discrimination are no longer significant barriers, however, if the current
conditions remain constant, suburban whites will continue to gain
advantage through the feed-back loop even without engaging in
any anti-competitive or racist behavior. Thus, even market adherents should agree that the workings of the market alone will not
ameliorate existing disparities and that some more broad-scale intervention will be required.
Die-hard market adherents may respond that the call for intervention presumes that community residents object to the current dis81. Id. at 735.
82. For an interesting discussion of the barriers to entry to housing faced by people of color, see Michelle Adams, Intergroup Rivalry, Anti-Competitive Conduct and Affirmative Action, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1117-22, 1144-53 (2002).
83. See Godsil, supra note 9, at 1838-71.
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tribution of pollution. This presumption, they claim, is without
basis. Rather, according to the “community preference” critique,
community residents have exercised their preferences already, either through elected representatives who favored the facility or by
choosing not to exit. According to the argument, developers seeking to build a polluting facility84 may in fact prefer to locate in a
“poor and/or minority communit[y]” because such a community
will have no “carrots to dangle before the desired industry” except
“the willingness to accept risk.”85 This willingness to accept risk is
simply a rational decision in light of the “constrained positions
from which they enter the market and/or the political process.”86
In sum, we should not interfere with the current distribution of polluting facilities because:
At some point, and at some level, representatives of host
communities make political and market-based determinations to permit the challenged sitings. In addition, the
residents of these communities have made decisions either to remain in the community after the challenged use
was sited, or, in many cases, to migrate to a community
playing host to such a land use. In such circumstances, it
is not clear why these preferences are more suspect than
the myriad of others that emerge from the political and
market system.87

The argument is that a poor and minority community may rationally choose88 to accept the risk of polluting facilities because they
84. Blais prefers the term “environmentally sensitive” land use because she “questions the accuracy of the assumption that all of the challenged land uses are undesirable in every locality (particularly in the community in which they are located). Blais,
supra note 4, at 78 n.8. While her sensitivity to language may be laudable to some, I will
continue to refer to such facilities as “polluting facilities” because this Article questions
whether any community with actual choices would ever voluntarily choose a polluting
facility over some other sort of economic development. See id. (comparing poor and
minority community’s choice of whether to host an “environmentally sensitive” land use
with an affluent white community’s decision to exchange tax concessions to host high
tech industrial enterprises).
85. Blais, supra note 4, at 105.
86. Id. at 81.
87. Id.
88. Blais’ reliance upon the supposed “choices” of residents of environmentally
beleaguered cities is overly facile. For a thoughtful discussion of consent theory, see
generally, DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY (1989).
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have few other choices if they want jobs and municipal services. Because it may be rational to value jobs and municipal services such as
education and police protection more than environmental quality,
any attempt to “interfere” with that choice — either by prohibiting
concentrations of facilities or by empowering the dissenters within
the community — will leave the community worse off.89
This account accepts as a given certain “constraints” faced by
communities of color, such as lower land values, inadequate municipal services, and minimal economic opportunities. This account
assumes away any potential limitations such communities may face
in the political process: “scholars expressing concern about preferences revealed through the representative process must do more
than simply invoke the once compelling complaint of underrepresentation of minorities.”90 It is equally unimpressed by claims
about a lack of public participation: “In reality, public participation
at the state and local level has not been a significant problem for
many years.”91 Finally, it is claimed, anyone who disagrees with a
decision to site a polluting facility may simply express their preferences with their feet.92
There is scant support for the assumptions underlying the
community preference critique.93 Rather, as Alice Kaswan details at
length in her recent article responding to the “community preference” critique, actual siting decisions often “fail to reflect equally
the preferences of facilities’ neighbors, and instead are often
skewed against the preferences of minority and low-income re89. Blais, supra note 4, at 100-04.
90. Id. at 123-24. Blais acknowledges the contention advanced by public choice
theorists that rent seeking behavior by powerful interest groups may bedevil attempts by
less powerful minority groups to be heard in the political process. Id. at 127. She
claims, however, that the “experience of successful minority organization around environmental equity issues belies this assertion.” Id. Curiously, none of her examples reflect a success resulting from the political process. Blais’ first example is the attempt to
stop the siting of the PCB facility in Warren County, which as described supra, failed.
See id. at 78. In her next two examples, minority communities were also unsuccessful in
preventing the siting of new polluting facilities though the community “extract[ed]
concessions involving capacity reductions and emission controls.” Id. at 128. The only
successful opposition was in West Dallas – where the community prevailed as the result
of a lawsuit. Id. at 128 n.223.
91. Id. at 126.
92. Id.
93. See Kaswan, supra note 6, at 1092-1133.
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sidents.”94 Community preference adherents may argue that the
residents are simply “losers” in the political process, who may vote
with their feet, or involve themselves in the political process to ensure better representation in the future.
As to the first response, it is clear that the persistence of housing discrimination and existing economic disparities prevent minorities and the poor from exercising their post-siting preferences
with the ease suggested by the community preference critique.95 As
to the second, it is precisely when a certain group is always the
“loser” in the political process that integrity of the political process
becomes suspect.
Even discounting the problematic underpinnings of community preference theory, this critique might be convincing if it were
true that redistributive remedies “would require communities to
give up benefits (e.g., jobs, tax revenues, etc.) that may outweigh
the value of the redistributed resource” thus entailing “a net loss for
the recipients.”96 In some instances, this argument has merit. For
example, the literature suggests that some Native American nations
have negotiated for hazardous waste facilities in order to obtain
much needed resources and have considered paternalistic environmentalists who tried to oppose their decision.97 Sadly, though, it is
atypical for urban areas saturated with polluting facilities to gain
any notable benefits from new facilities.98 As I have discussed elsewhere, new industries often receive tax abatements for locating in
economically distressed areas and rarely provide substantial numbers of entry-level jobs.99 In any event, that potential must be determined contextually. It certainly does not support the blanket claim
94. Id. at 1040.
95. Id. at 1138-44. While Blais acknowledges the existence of housing discrimination and the lack of mobility it causes, she nonetheless claims that the decision not to
leave a polluted community “reveals something about the relationship between the perceived burdens imposed by a challenged facility and the benefits derived from remaining in the community.” Blais, supra note 4, at 127.
96. Blais, supra note 4, at 135.
97. Kevin Gover & Jana L. Walker, Escaping Environmental Paternalism: One Tribe’s
Approach to Developing a Commercial Waste Disposal Project in Indian Country, 63 U. COLO. L.
REV. 933 (1992) (cited in CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & EILEEN GAUNA, ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY AND REGULATION 422 (2002)).
98. See generally Godsil, supra note 9.
99. Id. at 1873.
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that the focus on the distribution of polluting facilities is “misdirected.”100 But as the next Part will explore, the assumption that
the “remedy” to environmental racism is to spread noxious facilities
to all communities may be neither politically realistic nor normatively appealing.
PART II: RECONSIDERING REMEDIES — COMMUNITY PRESERVATION
OR INTEGRATION?
This Part will begin with the premise that we should be deeply
troubled by the link between race and pollution. Our challenge is
to determine how to respond. At present, most of us in the field
have been seeking to construct a vision of an “equitable” distribution of polluting facilities as among white communities and communities of color.101 With a few notable exceptions such as Robert
Bullard, we have not focused on the underlying issue of housing
segregation. Concurrently, housing scholars have engaged in debates about housing segregation which have tended to ignore the
risks of pollution. I hope this essay is the beginning of a conversation between scholars in the fields.
A. Community Empowerment
Most activists, advocates, and scholars addressing environmental justice issues propose as remedies various means of protecting
100. Blais, supra note 4, at 93-94. Blais also claims that environmental justice scholars’ emphasis on distributional equity prevent them from claiming that they are seeking
to enhance health and safety since what is not healthy and safe for poor and minorities
is not safe for white and wealthy. Id. at 135. But, this argument again ignores several
layers of reality. First, and most simply, environmental justice scholars do argue for
enhanced health and safety. Second, the focus on distribution often reflects failure of
environmental command and control regimes to consider harms of cumulative impact
– thus, even where emission limits are adequate if one facility is present, it may not be if
multiple. Third, Blais seems not to understand the expressive harm if members of one
racial group bear burdens while benefits are enjoyed by the majority. See generally Godsil, supra note 74.
101. This has proved more challenging than it would seem at first blush. As early as
1993, Vicki Been critiqued environmental justice activists and scholars for failing to set
forth a clear normative theory of justice. Been, supra note 3, at 80. While many environmental justice scholars have engaged in highly sophisticated work and have set forth
a dialogic vision of what constitutes environmental justice. See, e.g., Foster, supra note
20; Kaswan, supra note 6, no one has yet published a response to Been’s exhaustive
critiques of the different normative approaches.
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and preserving existing communities of color.102 This protection
or preservation takes various forms: preventing further siting of
noxious facilities;103 abating lead paint;104 equal enforcement of environmental laws;105 and perhaps most fundamentally, a transformative politics that will ensure that community members have an
actual voice in the local decision-making processes.106
The debate within the environmental justice literature has
been whether communities will best be protected by litigation,107
new legislation or regulation,108 or the political power garnered by
grassroots organizing.109 The vision that seems to animate environ102. See, e.g., Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David’s
Sling, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 523 (1994); Michael B. Gerrard, The Victims of NIMBY, 21
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495 (1994); Gauna, supra note 2; Naikang Tsao, Ameliorating Environmental Racism: A Citizens’ Guide to Combatting the Discriminatory Siting of Toxic Waste Dumps,
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 366, 379-405 (1992) (describing state statutory, common law, and
constitutional litigation remedies).
103. Tsao, supra note 102, at 394.
104. See Brody et al., supra note 50; CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
supra note 50; Brody, supra note 51; Mushak, supra note 51; Needleman, Childhood Lead
Poisoning, supra note 51; Needleman et al., Deficits, supra note 51.
105. Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Environmental Law, NAT’L L.J., at S1 (Sept. 21, 1992).
106. COLE & FOSTER, supra note 3, at 102. As Cole and Foster argue, a primary goal
of the environmental justice movement is “to redefine existing power relations, to unsettle cultural assumptions about race and class, and to create new possibilities for historically marginalized communities in local decision-making processes.” Id. at 105.
107. Few have argued that litigation should be the only or main method used for
environmental justice struggles, but many articles have focused on which litigation remedies would best serve communities in environmental justice disputes. See, e.g., Cole,
supra note 102, at 526-30 (recommending a focus on environmental laws rather than
civil rights laws); Gerrard, supra note 102, at 522 (discussing the use of environmental
siting laws in environmental justice disputes); Gauna, supra note 2, at 39-57 (discussing
the use of environmental citizen suits); Kaswan, supra note 6, at 1055-58 (noting that
environmental siting laws may provide information that can assist communities in challenges to siting under the Equal Protection Clause); Jill E. Evans, Challenging the Racism
in Environmental Racism: Redefining the Concept of Intent, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1219, 1277-87
(1998) (discussing a new formulation of intent that would assist communities engaged
in a challenge to a siting under the Equal Protection Clause); Serena M. Williams, The
Anticipatory Nuisance Doctrine: One Common Law Theory for Use in Environmental Justice
Cases, 19 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 223, 239-51 (1995) (discussing use of
anticipatory nuisance doctrine in siting disputes).
108. See, e.g., Godsil, supra note 23, at 421-26 (proposing federal environmental
justice legislation).
109. Luke Cole is perhaps best known for the contention that law suits may be a
mistake in environmental justice disputes on the ground that they take the struggle out
of the streets and into the courts where industry has the advantage. See, e.g., COLE &
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mental justice advocates and scholars (myself included) is of existing communities transforming themselves from quiescent
recipients to empowered agents.110 This is a powerful vision and
certainly should not be discarded lightly. But it does not address
segregation as a root cause of environmental injustices. Nor does it
respond to the host of other ills attributed to segregation such as
joblessness, poor education,111 high crime rates, and the social and
cultural isolation that “lead[ ] to political marginalization.”112
Environmental justice advocates and scholars have documented the role of segregation in leading to environmental racism
and injustice,113 yet most have not focused on integration as a remedy. Without discussing specific integrationist remedies, Cole and
Foster note the difficulty of integration, mentioning current white
aversion to integrated neighborhoods, and the aversion of some
FOSTER, supra note 3, at 129-30; Luke W. Cole, Macho Law Brains, Public Citizens, and
Grassroots Activists: Three Models of Environmental Advocacy, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 687 (1995);
Cole, Empowerment, supra note 23. Cole acknowledges that civil rights law suits may be
potent politically in the context of local fights, COLE & FOSTER, supra note 3, at 130, and
has acknowledged that environmental laws may provide the bases for community empowerment. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 23, at 654-59. As counsel, Cole has also
been crucial to many communities who have chosen to engage in legal challenges. For
example, Cole is a co-counsel in the suit challenging St. Lawrence Cement.
110. COLE & FOSTER, supra note 3, at 156-65. In previous work, I have shared this
vision. See generally Freeman & Godsil, Question of Risk, supra note 8; Godsil & Freeman,
Jobs, Trees and Autonomy, supra note 8. In my experience as a environmental justice
litigator with the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, I had the honor of
representing several communities that underwent the sort of transformative political
experience celebrated by Cole and Foster. See Rachel Godsil, The Street, the Courts, the
Legislature and the Press: Where Environmental Struggles Happen, in CHALLENGES TO EQUALITY: POVERTY AND RACE IN AMERICA 219 (Chester Hartman ed., 2001). Charles Barron, a
community leader I worked with closely, has subsequently been elected to the New York
City Council, where he has been an outspoken leader. See Vivian S. Toy, Brooklyn Councilman to Run for Mayor in ’05, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2004, at B3. Indeed, he attempted to
run for mayor of New York City in 2004, though he exited the race to support another
Black candidate. See Winnie Hu, Councilman Expects to Quit Democratic Mayoral Race, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2005, at B6.
111. See generally GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION:
THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1996); THE EDUCATION TRUST,
EDUCATION WATCH: THE 1996 EDUCATION TRUST STATE AND NATIONAL DATA BOOK 6-8
(1996).
112. COLE & FOSTER, supra note 3, at 69-70.
113. Robert Bullard has been most prolific on the link between environmental racism and segregation. See, e.g., CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 23;
BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 23; Bullard, supra note 3; Bullard, Race and
Environmental Justice, supra note 23; Massey, supra note 15.

R
R
R
R

R

R
R
R
R

\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-4\NLR408.txt

1134

unknown

Seq: 26

29-APR-05

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

9:31

[Vol. 49

Blacks to living in all white neighborhoods.114 But because residential segregation leads to the very political and economic conditions
that cause environmental injustice, integrationist remedies must be
part of the dialogue.
The only prominent environmental justice scholar to call specifically for integration (or at least an end to segregation) as a remedy to environmental racism is Robert Bullard, who has argued:
Institutionalized racism created the urban ghettoes and
accompanying housing, economic and environmental ills
that afflict their inhabitants . . . . Southern and “Sunbelt”
inner cities . . . are well on their way to duplicating the
fiscal and infrastructural problems of urban centers . . .
i.e., unemployment, dependency, limited education,
crowded housing, and poverty . . . . The time is long overdue for the nation to turn its attention to the problems of
housing discrimination, residential segregation, neighborhood disinvestment, redlining, and environmental racism – all of which contribute to urban decline.115

Bullard does not address, however, tensions between remedies to
the societal ills he addresses, and therefore does not suggest ways to
resolve those tensions.
B. Tensions between Integration and Community Preservation
In the housing literature, scholars have long debated the competing philosophies of community preservation and integration.116
Critical race scholars seek an emphasis on “spatial equality” rather
114. COLE & FOSTER, supra note 3, at 68.
115. Massey, supra note 15, at 85.
116. Compare MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 14, at 225-27 (advocating integration)
and Florence Wagman Roisman, The Lessons of American Apartheid: The Necessity and
Means of Promoting Residential Racial Integration, 81 IOWA L. REV. 479 (1995), with John O.
Calmore, Spatial Equality and the Kerner Commission Report: A Back-to-the-Future Essay,
71 N.C. L. REV. 1487 (1993). See also A. Brooke Overby, Shaping American Communities:
Segregation, Housing & The Urban Poor: The Community Reinvestment Act Reconsidered, 143
U. PA. L. REV. 1431 (1995) (advocating strengthening black community); Michelle Adams, Separate and UnEqual: Housing Choice, Mobility, and Equalization in the Federally Subsidized Housing Program, 71 TUL. L. REV. 413, 455-64 (1996) (discussing the shortcomings
of mobility programs and proposing instead an equalization strategy that would recognize the needs and desires of affected black families).
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than integration.117 John Calmore, for example, levies a critique
against the “integration imperative” and suggests instead “nonsegregation” as an alternative.118 Nonsegregation allows people of
color to choose whether to stay where they are, even if in an area
comprised exclusively or predominantly of people of color, but also
removes barriers to moving elsewhere.119 Calmore contends that
this option is necessary because integration forces Blacks to sacrifice community “for a better housing package.”120 Spatial equality
is intended to prevent this depressing choice.
Integrationists argue by contrast that racial integration is necessary to allow poor Blacks and Latinos to obtain access to the opportunity structure, which includes education, health care, and
jobs, necessary to succeed in our society.121 Some integrationists,
notably john powell and Florence Roisman, contend that whites as
well as people of color have been harmed by segregation122 and
that “integration, . . . when properly conceived, is inclusive and
transformative.”123 Powell rejects the arguments made by community preservationists for “self-imposed segregation,” claiming that
the majority of Blacks would prefer to live in integrated communities and reiterating the harm to the poor and minorities of isolation
from the larger society.124 According to powell, integration of ur117. Calmore, supra note 116, at 1498. Calmore cites Robert F. Forman, Gary
Peller, and Henry W. McGee, Jr., among others, for the proposition that equalization
within communities, rather than integration per se, should be the goal.
118. Id.
119. Id. (quoting ROBERT F. FORMAN, BLACK GHETTOS, WHITE GHETTOS AND SLUMS
46 (1971)).
120. Id. at 1504-05. Calmore quotes Black professionals who choose to remain in
all-Black neighborhoods despite the financial ability to live elsewhere as valuing the
proximity of other Black role models for their children, the “relief upon returning
home to a black environment after having endured the job stress of ‘competing on a
white playing field all day.’” Id. at 1507 (quoting Karen Grigsby Bates, View Park: A Case
Study in Racial Ironies, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1989, at 1).
121. john a. powell, Living and Learning: Linking Housing and Education, 80 MINN. L.
REV. 749, 758 (1996).
122. powell quotes John Dewey for the proposition that an isolated community
“makes for rigidity and formal institutionalizing of life, for static and selfish ideals
within the group.” Id. at 777 n. 101 (quoting JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION
99 (1916)). See also Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047
(1996) (discussing the limitations to suburban life).
123. powell, supra note 121, at 778 (arguing against Black rejection of integration).
124. Id. at 786-87. powell quotes studies finding that 12% of Blacks prefer to live in
all-Black neighborhoods, while 31% would be unwilling to live in all-Black neighbor-
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ban communities is necessary to their improvement because only
an integrated community will attract resources and attention.125 Finally, powell contends, the founding ideals of our country and our
democracy require integration: “Integration makes it possible for
those historically excluded from participating in society to be part
of a larger community, while necessarily transforming that
community.”126
In contrast, following their ideological commitment, community preservationists argue for remedies that would increase the fiscal health of inner cities such as the creation of enterprise and
empowerments zones, tax sharing which brings tax dollars from
suburbs and exurbs to inner cities, and various efforts to increase
home ownership in inner cities.127 Community preservationists demand that HUD equalize the conditions in public housing.128 Integrationists stress the importance of housing mobility programs that
allow low-income people of color to move away from racially segregated communities.129 Not surprisingly, for many, the ideal is to
hoods. Id. at 786 n. 125 (citing MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 14, at 89-90). A majority
of Blacks would prefer to live in a neighborhood that is 50% Black and 50% white, but
95% would willingly live in a neighborhood that is 15% Black. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 792.
127. Florence Wagman Roisman, Sustainable Development and Land Use Law: Sustainable Development in Suburbs and Their Cities: The Environmental and Financial Imperatives of
Racial, Ethnic, and Economic Inclusion, 3 WID. L. SYMP. J. 87, 107-08 (1998) (citing CENTER
FOR NATIONAL POLICY AND LOCAL INITIATIVES SUPPORT CORP., LIFE IN THE CITY: A STATUS
REPORT ON THE REVIVAL OF URBAN COMMUNITIES IN AMERICA (1997)); ANTHONY DOWNS,
NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA 101-03, 132 (1994); John Kasarda, Urban
Change and Minority Opportunities, in THE NEW URBAN REALITY 33, 34 (Paul E. Peterson
ed., 1985); MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND
STABILITY 84-87 (1997); U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, STATE OF THE
CITIES 21-22, 28, 48-51(1997); John P. Blair et al., The Central City Elasticity Hypothesis: A
Critical Appraisal of Rusk’s Theory of Urban Development, 62 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 345, 346-47
(1996); Georgette C. Poindexter, Addressing Morality in Urban Brownfield Redevelopment:
Using Stakeholder Theory to Craft Legal Process, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 37 (1995); Nicholas
Lemann, The Myth of Community Development, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1994, at Mag. 27; Robyn
Meredith, A Revival in the Motor City: U.S. Program Helps Return Industry to a Depressed Area,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1997, at D1).
128. Calmore, supra note 116, at 1515.
129. Roisman, supra note 127, at 108. The mobility program that stemmed from
the Supreme Court’s decision in Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976), known as the
Gautreaux Assisted Housing Program, is perhaps the model mobility program. Lasting
for twenty years, the Gautreaux program assisted seven thousand low-income Black families move from inner city Chicago to suburbs and other parts of Chicago. See generally
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have both: improve the central cities while allowing people full access to the suburbs.130 But there are instances when a particular
remedy is found to increase integration but potentially to lessen the
likelihood of community preservation, or alternatively, a remedy
may enhance an inner city community, but increase segregation.131
An example of this phenomenon is the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (“CRA”)132 that scholars have found may actually
have the effect of perpetuating racial segregation.133 The CRA was
enacted to eliminate the practice of redlining and to “encourage
[financial] institutions to help meet the credit needs of the local
communities in which they are chartered . . .”134 In enforcing the
CRA, federal regulators assess several factors: the location of the
homes for which loans were sought (referred to as the geographic
patterns of loan origination), a correspondence between deposits
in a neighborhood and loan origination, and evidence of racially
discriminatory practices.135
Schill and Wachter hypothesized that the combination of these
factors have created an incentive for lending institutions to provide
loans to poor people purchasing homes in poor communities, thus
creating a “loan concentration effect” and steering poor people to
purchase homes in poor communities.136 To determine whether
this hypothesis was correct, Schill and Wachter analyzed whether a
poor person applying for a mortgage to purchase a home in a nonpoor area was more likely to be rejected than a person purchasing a
home in a poor area.137 Using standard methods of assessing risk,
one would assume that homes in non-poor areas would be a better
value for a lending institution. But Schill and Wachter’s study
LEONARD S. RUBINOWITZ & JAMES E. ROSENBAUM, CROSSING THE CLASS AND COLOR LINES:
FROM PUBLIC HOUSING TO WHITE SUBURBIA (2000).
130. Roisman, supra note 127, at 112.
131. Or as John Calmore contends, the “let’s do it all” approach ignores the need
to set priorities. Calmore, supra note 116, at 1512.
132. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-125, tit. VIII, 91 Stat.
1147 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 2901-05 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
133. Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law
and Policy: Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285, 1314 (1995).
134. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
135. See Schill & Wachter, supra note 133, at 1321 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 228.7(e)-(f)
(1994)).
136. Id.
137. Id.
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found that, rather than being less likely to be rejected when they
apply for loans in non-poor neighborhoods, low-income applicants
are almost three times more likely to be rejected than when applying in a poor neighborhood.138 Similarly, the study found that
“black applicants were more likely than white applicants to be accepted in predominantly black neighborhoods.”139 Thus, an unintended consequence of the incentives created by the CRA may have
been to intensify the spatial concentration of race and poverty in
America’s cities.140
There are going to be repeated instances in which it may be
necessary to choose whether community preservation or integration is paramount, and environmental justice concerns add an element of urgency to this choice. It is imperative that people of color
not continue to have their health imperiled by toxins and their children poisoned by lead. Indeed, in a recent study of the United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”)
“Moving to Opportunity” demonstration, researchers found that
children who moved to low-poverty neighborhoods “experienced
fewer injuries, fewer asthma attacks, and improved mental
health.”141
The question is how best to achieve that goal. There are two
competing lessons from the post-civil rights era: one is that integration has been extraordinarily difficult to achieve and that some
138. Id. at 1327.
139. Id. at 1328.
140. Id. at 1321. Schill and Wachter also note that, “[t]o the extent that the CRA
encourages financial institutions to take undue risks,” the fact that some studies have
reported higher than average rates of default among the poor and minorities might
ultimately lead to greater disinvestment. Id. It is important to take into account, however, the studies showing that Black and Hispanics are rejected at substantially higher
rates than whites even when controlling for variables such as credit history and socioeconomic status. See generally Glenn B. Canner, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: Expanded
Data on Residential Lending, 77 FED. RES. BULL. 859 (1991) (finding Black applicants to
be rejected at a rate of 33.9%, Latino applicants to be rejected at a rate of 21.4%, white
applicants to be rejected at a rate of 14.4%); Alicia H. Munnell et al., FEDERAL RESERVE
BANK OF BOSTON, Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA Data, in WORKING PAPER
SERIES No. 92-7 (Oct. 1992) (after controlling for socioeconomic, locational, and credit
history variables, finding Black and Latino applicants in Boston 56% more likely than
whites to be rejected for a mortgage loan). For a discussion of these studies, see Schill
& Wachter, supra note 133, at 1316-18.
141. CHOOSING A BETTER LIFE? EVALUATING THE MOVING TO OPPORTUNITY SOCIAL
EXPERIMENT 321 (John Goering & Judith D. Feins eds., 2003).
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within communities of color favor retaining a separate sense of
community and culture, and the other is that segregation entrenches white political and economic dominance. I suggest, in addition, that integration may be a necessary precondition to
environmental justice.142
On a concrete level, when a racially segregated neighborhood
is already saturated with polluting facilities, and a new facility is proposed, the residents have a choice of fleeing or fighting. The environmental justice literature is replete with stories of people fighting
(and sometimes winning) against proposed facilities; it has not generally celebrated decisions made by families to try to use the proposed new use as leverage to leave.143 In a recent article, I
suggested a remedy rooted in nuisance law that would allow residents of historically disempowered communities to choose by majority vote between an injunctive remedy enjoining the proposed
polluting land use and a damages remedy that would allow them to
purchase a home in a non-racially segregated community.144 The
“Resident’s Choice Rule” does not attempt to prejudge what any
given community should choose. Instead, its goal is to provide residents of historically disempowered communities the kind of autonomy that that the white middle class has enjoyed since the
advent of zoning and land use laws.
Here, I want to suggest in brief why environmental justice advocates and scholars might want to focus on finding integrative
strategies rather than community preservationist strategies – at least
for the most polluted areas. First, the goal of equally distributing
polluting facilities across communities is politically impossible. As
Vicki Been demonstrated in her trenchant critiques of environmental justice advocates’ visions of environmental justice (including
mine), wealthy white people will be able to isolate themselves from
virtually any siting scheme.145 Second, for many of the most pollut142. See generally Roisman, supra note 127.
143. One exception to this general trend is instances in which communities live
near Superfund sites. Environmental justice advocates have worked closely with communities to ensure that they have been relocated. EPA, SUPERFUND, CONFERENCES,
available at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/conferences/. Indeed, in one instance, environmental justice advocates helped a community achieve a relocation package that
rebuilt their community in another location so that they could stay together. Id.
144. Godsil, supra note 9, at 1871-86.
145. Been, supra note 3, at 1032-40 & 1047-52.
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ing facilities, it is environmentally preferable to have a few large
facilities, rather than many smaller facilities. A smaller number of
large facilities will benefit from economies of scale that will allow
for better-constructed facilities. In addition, as Michael Gerrard
has written, transportation of certain materials is ultimately riskier
than the storage of such materials.146 Therefore, it is preferable to
concentrate the creation and storage of certain materials rather
than dispersing them. Third, land use and environmental planners
generally agree — and I suspect most of us do as well — that, to the
extent possible, it is preferable to concentrate noxious land uses
away from people. Therefore, it seems generally preferable to
move people away from polluting facilities to more environmentally
suitable environs, rather than to pollute more places. Finally, I
would argue that the existence of poor, politically marginalized
communities allows the rest of us to externalize the burdens of pollution, as well as the burdens of responding to the needs of the
poor. If we focus on economically and racially integrating our communities, ideally, the “they” becomes a “we.”
C. Pragmatics of Integration
This essay is intended to be a catalyst for further discussion
about both the normative ideal of integration and then the
pragmatics of accomplishing this ideal. But some may contend that
such a conversation is merely an exercise in academic idealism
since integration has proved impossible to achieve. While conventional wisdom supports the view that integration has met with enormous white resistance, there is also some recent evidence of
success. In a forthcoming paper entitled Radical Integration,147 Professor Michelle Adams examines two housing mobility programs
that provided opportunities for low-income residents, many African-American and Latino, to move to predominantly white or integrated communities: the Gautreaux Program. The Gautreaux
Program arose out of Hills v. Gautreaux,148 and a HUD sponsored
146. Michael B. Gerrard, Safety Hazards in Hazardous Waste Remediation, 228 N.Y. L.J.
3 (2002).
147. Adams, supra note 10.
148. 425 U.S. 284 (1976). In Gautreaux, HUD was found liable for supporting the
Chicago Housing Authority’s program of segregating public housing and for engaging
in discriminatory tenant selection procedures. Id. at 287 (citing Gautreaux v. Chicago

\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-4\NLR408.txt

2005]

unknown

Seq: 33

29-APR-05

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE INTEGRATION IDEAL

9:31

1141

demonstration program, “Moving to Opportunity for Fair
Housing.”149
The Gatreaux Program is the country’s most ambitious residential, racial, and economic integration effort to date.150 The goal
of the program was “movement of low-income Black families into
predominantly white areas.”151 The program served approximately
6,000 families during a seventeen-year-period and was generally a
very positive experience for the Gautreaux participants.152 As Adams explains:
The Gautreaux movers perceived their new ‘suburban
neighborhoods as much safer than their former city
neighborhoods — both during the day and night’ While
there is no question that some movers experienced racial
hostility and negative social interactions in their new settings, after a time those negative interactions decreased
and many movers reported ’finding a sense of community
that they felt was lacking in their city neighborhoods.’ At
the same time, the suburban Gautreaux movers were also
more likely to form interracial friendships than the GauHous. Auth., 296 F.Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969)). The Court found that “the public housing system operated by [the Chicago Housing Authority] was racially segregated, with
four overwhelmingly white projects located in white neighborhoods and with 99 1/2%
of the remaining family units located in Negro neighborhoods and 99% of those units
occupied by Negro tenants.” Id. at 288 (citation omitted).
149. See HUD, Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing, at http://www.hud.gov/
progdesc/mto.ctm.
150. RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 129, at 2.
151. Id. at 39. Under the program, HUD provided rental assistance to allow participants to find housing in the private market. Id. at 37. As Adams notes:
More specifically, the Gautreaux Program provided recipients with Section
8 rental assistance which provides ‘rent subsidies for low-income families to
live in private housing, making up the difference between the market rent
and a specified percentage of tenants’ income.’ The program required that
at least 75% of the participants live in the suburbs, and it capped the number of participants who could choose to live in areas with large proportions
of minority group members. ‘The suburban movers left neighborhoods
that were over 90 percent Black and entered areas that averaged 96 percent
white.’ The program also provided housing counseling to participants providing them with information about housing opportunities in suburban
communities, and worked with the suburban real estate industry in order to
facilitate the entry of black families into suburban areas.
Adams, supra note 10, at 146.
152. RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 129, at 67, 188. The program was formally established in 1981 and ended in early 1998. Id. at 188.
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treaux movers who remained in the city. Suburban movers also experienced enhanced educational and
employment opportunities as a result of relocation.153

Adams also details the general success of HUD’s Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing demonstration program.154 This program began in the mid-1990s in order to determine whether the
“federal Section 8 program rental assistance program, could be effectively used to assist poor, largely minority families in successfully
relocating to private rental housing in working-class or middle-class
neighborhoods.”155
Again, the program showed evidence that racial and economic
integration leads to positive outcomes:
First, MTO families lived in more racially and economically mixed communites. Second, MTO children in Boston and Baltimore attended better schools. Third, there
were significant reductions in risky bahavior, especially in
marijuana use and smoking for [MTO] girls between the
ages of 15 and 19. Fourth, MTO adults showed significant
improvements in mental health and reductions in obesity.
Finally, many MTO families remained in low-poverty areas
after the one-year requirement period.156

Indeed, environmental justice advocates are beginning to recognize that relocation may be in the best interests of community
residents living in the most environmentally devastated areas. For
example, the Concerned Citizens of Norco (“Norco”), a community
group comprised of residents living near the New Orleans Refinery
Company in Lousiana’s Cancer Alley, recently won a settlement in
which the company offered residents the choice of relocating and
selling their homes to Shell Petroleum Development Company or

153.
154.
155.
Mobility
ING TO

Adams, supra note 10, at 34-35.
Id. at 36-37.
Id. at 36 (quoting John Goering et al., What Have We Learned about Housing
and Poverty Deconcentration? in CHOOSING A BETTER LIFE? EVALUATING THE MOVOPPORTUNITY SOCIAL EXPERIMENT 6 (John Goering & Judith D. Feins eds.,

2003)).
156. Adams, supra note 10, at 37-38.
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receiving home improvement loans at a favorable level.157 A relocated Norco resident commented to Monique Harden, an environmental justice lawyer who heads the New Orleans-based Advocates
for Environmental Human Rights, “I now have a beautiful house fit
for a king.”158 Harden appropriately responded: “Well, you deserve it. Because you are a king.”159
CONCLUSION
Sheryll Cashin suggests that the ideal of residential integration
has “all but disappeared from public discourse” and that it “boasts
few ardent constituents.”160 Those who are concerned about
continuing environmental injustice should consider whether we
need to become ardent constituents of integration, as well as community preservation, in order to achieve the vision of an adequate
environment for families.

157. THE FORD FOUNDATION, CLOSE TO HOME: CASE STUDIES OF HUMAN RIGHTS
WORK IN THE UNITED STATES 97 (2004), available at www.fordfound.org/publications/
recent_articles/close_to_home.cfm.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. CASHIN, supra note 10, at 734.
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